I decided to rename my blog “Is-Ought GAP: The Cure for Oughtism,” simultaneously turning separate eristic jokes by Stephan Kinsella and another libertarian on their heads.1
The following are some excerpts from two sections of one chapter of Veatch’s For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory. Veatch calls the mentality he describes the proofreader’s mentality because it allows him to make good use of an analogy (see below), but I think “scientistic mentality” is more appropriate and informative.
Veatch starts with the following quotation from Hume:
But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact,. . . Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object.
After quoting from the Trial of Socrates, and before that from Pride and Prejudice, as illustrations:
Now surely no one can consider this account which Socrates gives of his own behavior without recognizing that here was indeed a man of no ordinary worth – brave, but without being in the least ostentatious about it; and with a real sense of justice, from which he was not to be deterred by either threats or blandishments, be they from the Left or from the Right. How then could Hume possibly maintain that you have but to consider a man like Socrates, admitted to be virtuous, to examine his character and behavior in all lights, and you will find that his virtue entirely escapes you? Could it be that Hume was somehow strangely value-blind, or, perhaps, virtue-blind? Or must we not rather explain it by saying that when Hume claimed simply to look at the facts and to find no values in them, he was but displaying what we might call a sort of proofreader’s mentality? It’s as if he had so trained himself as to be able to read letters, words, and sentences, but without heeding the sense or meaning of what is being said at all. Not that such sense and meaning are not there; instead, it’s just that the proofreader in reading an author has no particular eye for the sense, but only for the typographical errors. And so analogously, when Hume insists that, in examining an action admitted to be virtuous or vicious, such virtue and vice entirely escape him, this surely betokens no more than that Hume has no eye for values, not that such values are not really there in the facts at all.
And here’s part of Veatch’s explanation for the mentality (although something is being lost by my not quoting the entire section dealing with the explanation, or indeed the entire book):
The explanation is not far to seek, given the particular ontological account of nature and character of objects that we have here been putting forward. For the so-called properties of an object, in addition to being just what they are as such, are also actualities of prior potentialities in the object. Indeed, in this latter respect, they even have the character of “perfections” answering to that appetitus for completion and fulfillment that any potentiality simply is. Any particular property, ‘a’, in addition to being just itself, namely, ‘a’, is at the same time something desireable, when considered in its relation to the appetitus of a prior potentiality. But so also is it something intelligible when considered in relation to a possible knower or knowers. And no less is it an effect when considered in relation to the causes that produced it. Accordingly, all of these further features of ‘a’ that are, as it were, supervenient and characterize ‘a’, just insofar as it stands in relation to other things – to causes, to prior potentialities, to knowers, etc. – may, of course, be abstracted from ‘a’ so that ‘a’ may be considered just in itself.
Nevertheless, the mere fact that something may thus be considered in abstraction from certain of the features that pertain to it by no means implies that that thing can actually exist in abstraction from such supervenient aspects, or even that one can fail to see that the thing has these, the minute the thing is considered not in abstraction but in its concreteness. Right here, then, would appear to be the source of Hume’s mistake and of his unfortunate blindness. For the mere fact that objective facts can be viewed in abstraction from the values and disvalues that pertain to them certainly does not mean either that they must be so viewed or that values and disvalues are not factual and objective.
(It should not be necessary to point out but will be pointed out anyway that Veatch does not take this to be a one-shot, knock-down argument against Hume; he has others. And these are, of course, merely excerpts from the full argument.)
This disorder, no offense to all those poor deficient souls who suffer from it, might also be called “oughtism” as a play on words with the disorder “autism.”2 Accordingly, “oughtism” may be defined as “a brain development, or just a mental, disorder characterized by an impaired ability to recognize and understand natural values/norms/oughts.”
“Oughtism” may be defined as “a brain development, or just a mental, disorder characterized by an impaired ability to recognize and understand natural values/norms/oughts.”
The cure for oughtism lies in developing an understanding of (neo-)Aristotelian philosophy. I may go into more detail on these issues in a later blogpost, but this should suffice to explain the blog title change. However, you are invited to read chapter 4 of my dissertation and the relevant sources I cite therein.
![Reblog this post [with Zemanta]](http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_b.png?x-id=c8b79a33-8c7f-454f-9a50-08d17dd57d87)
- No public links are available for the two jokes. Sorry. ↩
- Hat tip to Jon Irenicus of the Mises.com forum for this twist on the “oughtism” joke. It’s a far more fitting meaning than “belief in the existence of oughts” I think.
↩
Related Posts
- My dissertation is completed, approved and now online
- A Brief Note on Robbins, Rand, and Atheism
- Liberty, Virtue, and the Autobot Way
- Comments on Roderick Long’s “Inside and Outside Spooner’s Natural Law Jurisprudence”
- Immanent Politics, Participatory Democracy, and the Pursuit of Eudaimonia
Print This Post
{ 14 comments… read them below or add one }
Do you not except at least some sense of an is/ought dichotomy, as a formal categorical distinction between description and prescription? That is, I don’t think it’s possible to *directly* derived an “ought” from an “is” in a self-referential and circular sense. For example, an argument along the lines of “I exist, therefore I should exist” or “I own property, therefore I should own property” wouldn’t seem coherant, and any notion that you ought to be or do something that is already innate or inherent kind of destroys the whole point of using it as a prescription.
Which idea or videos exactly are you refering to? I saw the one you responded to a few weeks ago, but other than that I’m not sure what you’re refering to.
BP,
Regarding your first comment: Sure, the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive statements is a valid one, and those arguments you use as examples are not valid. An absolute separation is not valid though; and if it were, then prescriptions/norms/values/oughts would have no truth value (true or false) and could not serve their normal functions in logic and argumentation. If you accept modern metaphysical and epistemological errors, sure the is-ought gap looks unbridgeable. Part of the solution is reject these: the strict fact-value dichotomy, an extreme mechanistic/atomistic conception of reality, modern enumerative induction. And return to a (neo-)Aristotelian essentialism, teleology (at least for human action) and classical induction. Hume’s argument about the is-ought gap is correct only when limited to strict deductive proofs (like syllogisms) and even then it’s only an extension of a non-controversial principle of logic to ethics. His argument does not apply to classical induction and it relies upon the metaphysical and epistemological errors I mentioned above. Values are a species of fact. At least some “is’s” imply an ought.
Regarding your second comment: I don’t know what you’re talking about. I didn’t refer to any video. You’re not “the other libertarian” to whom I referred.
I’m compelled to think that there’s neither an absolute separation or conflation between the two, it just depends on the context and how directly one is trying to make the connection.
It’s the simplistic and overtly deontological libertarian theories (such as “argumentation ethics” and “universally preferable behavior”) that I think inherently collapse due to a sort of is/ought dichotomy that is valid.
For example, the argument that argueing against self-ownership implicitly proves self-ownership conflates physiological autonomy with the right to not have one’s person infringed upon.
About my second comment: that was accidental. It was a copy/paste in response to someone on a completely different blog. Sorry for the confusion.
“For example, the argument that argueing against self-ownership implicitly proves self-ownership conflates physiological autonomy with the right to not have one’s person infringed upon.”
Yes, and I find it perplexing that Stephan Kinsella can see the distinction between possession/control and ownership clearly enough to criticize mutualists and Georgists over it with regard to absentee ownership, while he cannot see that his own account of rights makes the mistake of collapsing this distinction.
Eventually, down at the very core, we have some “ought” that is not derivable from observation or nature. Whether it be “do no harm” or “non-aggression” or something else, it is not derivable from reason. Good, evil, cruel, kind, are all aspects of human nature and human understanding, produced not from man’s logical deduction but how he was shaped by evolution/heredity and experiential factors. But none of this means a man SHOULD do anything, anymore than the silly idea that man’s moral purpose is to spreading genes.
Now, if you already hold a particular ought or goal, then an ought can have a truth distinction if it helps you reach that goal. “I ought to take aspirin” is “true” if your goal is to get rid of your headache. If I have a headache, and if I take aspirin, then I will lose my headache. I don’t want a head, therefore, I should take aspirin…
Perhaps I “suffer” from “oughtism.” I’m not convinced the is-ought gap is ultimately breachable in its strongest form.
Or I could take a theory-of-mind attack–at what point does a robot become sentient/complex enough for such “objective morality” to apply? We certainly don’t treat out computers as having any moral status; but what about AI? Why do you choose this criteria? Or do you deny nonhuman consciousness or at least machine consciousness?
What if a human is made complete in every way except without any care of others (no moral sense–pure sociopathy)? What if an entire planet was populated by such a ruthless sort–what would even be the meaning or point of morals to them and how would they even “discover” them?
It’s pretty strange that people that tend to argue for objective morality argue for an objective morality strangely in line with an evolution-produced human nature and conception of things. I don’t see how just because something IS, it MUST ACT in any particular way, ultimately. I certainly don’t see why human moral sense deserves some sort of status of being intrinsic to the universe.
Hume’s emotivism (at least that how I understand it) seems pretty solid to me…
And I will say, as a disclaimer, that I am a full-blown libertarian, not the petty LP/vulgar type of the Bob Barrian infection but an uncompromising voluntaryist. How do I argue my ethical stance to others, then? Either by trying to find what’s really important to others, finding a sort of “central premise” to their morality, and trying to go from there, or giving up on them entirely and realizing they’ll always be an ideological enemy on the battlefield of life.
Most of us have some sort of agreement that we want to be free. The trick is is to get others to agree that libertarianism is true freedom, and to cultivate a respect of the freedom of others.
Great Post & A sharp lookin' new Blog.
Thanks for the link to your dissertation; as you commented once, I think, on Roderick T. Long's blog once (paraphrase), "Thanks for free education."
I think John R. Searle's quick and clean derivation of an ought from an is, here: http://tinyurl.com/lz3cyt, is not the whole story, by no means, but it does vindicate your and Veatch's position (mine as well) and significantly pushes the "burden of proof/rejoinder" into the dichotomists court.
Happy Blogging and congratulations Doctor,
-J
Xenu,
“Eventually, down at the very core, we have some “ought” that is not derivable from observation or nature.”
I disagree.
“Whether it be “do no harm” or “non-aggression” or something else, it is not derivable from reason.”
Again, I disagree. I also object to the “from reason” part. Sounds Kantian. “By reason” is more accurate.
From the rest, it sounds vaguely like you reject categorical imperatives and embrace hypothetical imperatives. We’re in agreement on this much. The type of hypothetical imperative you discuss, however, is called a problematic hypothetical imperative (IF-THEN). I do not think these can serve as a fundamental basis for ethics. For that, you need an assertoric hypothetical imperative (SINCE-THEN). On this and naturalist ethics see my dissertation and the sources I cite therein.
Regarding Hume’s emotivism: No, I think it is woefully inadequate for ethical theory. See chapter 10 of Roderick Long’s Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action for one devastating criticism of emotivism. Of course, I also find his metaphysics and epistemology to be greatly flawed.
“Or I could take a theory-of-mind attack–at what point does a robot become sentient/complex enough for such “objective morality” to apply?”
That’s more of an empirical/practical question, not really a challenge of the rationality criterion. I’m not sure I have the expertise to answer it. Maybe nobody does at this point. I don’t think any computer or robot has achieved a rational faculty yet. When/if any do, then I think they must be classified as persons (or moral agents).
“What if a human is made complete in every way except without any care of others (no moral sense–pure sociopathy)? What if an entire planet was populated by such a ruthless sort–what would even be the meaning or point of morals to them and how would they even “discover” them?”
Would such a being even be human any longer? How would such a being be made? What would be the meaning of morals to such a being? At the very least: survival. But probably more: surviving well, or flourishing (in some fashion).
If an entire planet were populated by such a ruthless sort, I think it would quickly become severely depopulated as they kill each other off, perhaps to extinction. If they are not too mentally defective. maybe eventually the few remaining survivors would discover rules of social conduct that enable them to better achieve their ends and they would adhere to them with a ruthless efficiency. If they are so defective that even this would be impossible for them, then I daresay they probably do not qualify as rational.
Thanks James!
I confess I still haven’t taken the time to read up on Searle yet. Thanks for the link.
You are Welcome Geoffrey.
RE: Searle. Searle is on my list, but near the bottom. I was researching Philippa Foot and stumbled across his essay; its a quick read and puts a considerable dent in the “hard is/ought gap” case.
He seems to be influenced by Wittgenstein, Austin and Anscombe; which supports a case that he is in the Aristotelean camp.
This should make any integration of his ideas enjoyable; I know Prof. Long has written well of him.
Take care,
-J
I disagree with you about my comment being eristic. Let’s argue about it. I hereby declare that you concede I am right, if you fail to reply to this, or even if you do.
Hi Dr. Plauche,
It seems Veatch is strawmanning Hume. He uses the quote of Hume's to characterize him, as being, due the "proofreader's mentality", curiously unable to see virtue, vice and value which others can see so plainly; it's as if to say, "Silly Hume, the vice in willful murder may entirely escape him, because he's trained himself not to see it." Veatch even characterizes Hume as someone who wouldn't find any virtue in the character of Socrates.
This strawman is made possible by the fact that Veatch doesn't quote Hume's full argument on the matter. Here's the last sentence Veatch quoted following by the rest of the argument (emphasis added):
"The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but `tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
So, Hume does recognize virtue, vice, and value. And presumably he would be disgusted by a willful murder and be inspired by the courage of Socrates. He is simply saying that the value implied by such disgust and inspiration would reside in his heart's response to the murder and of Socrates and not within the qualities of the objects themselves.
Lilburne,
I'll admit the full quote complicates the picture somewhat, but I do not think it seriously affects Veatch's point. Notice that Hume says he can only recognize the goodness or badness of something by the way he feels and he has to deliberately turn inward to examine that feeling. This fits with Veatch's characterization of the proofreader's mentality such that Hume has so trained himself that he cannot recognize virtue and vice when he sees it.
You say that Hume's feelings, apart from reason and the nature of the thing in question, do constitute a recognition of virtue and vice but I think Veatch would deny that it does. For Hume, it is merely a recognition about how he feels about something, not about what that something actually is, and it is only due to one's feelings that we can call anything virtuous or vicious. It's just emotivist "Yaying" and "Booing" borrowing the trappings of moral language.
It often strikes me that people who find the is/ought gap unbridgeable expect ‘ought’ claims not to be grounded in claims about what is good for the agents who purportedly should or ought to do something. If claiming that some agent ought or should do X simply means that the agent has strong reasons to do X (and this is, I would submit, all that it really means), then we should expect that the truth of any ought-claim will depend on whether some good is to be achieved or some harm avoided by doing X. I’m not sure if I’m entirely happy with the ‘assertoric hypothetical imperative’ account (why think that I have good reason to pursue X just because I can’t help but pursue X?), but at the very least it points to a misunderstanding of ‘ought’ claims that often motivates acceptance of an is/ought gap. But once we see that ‘ought’ claims, properly understood, are always relative to *some* goods to be promoted, respected, or defended, then that difficulty largely disappears. What we are left with is not an is/ought problem, but an is/good problem. In other words, are there goods whose goodness is not a consequence of their being desired by an agent or somehow instrumentally related to goods that are desired by an agent? The reality of objective goods is, I submit, the primary disagreement between those who accept an is/ought gap and those who reject it.
Subjectivists sometimes reject this account of the disagreement on the grounds that the dispute about the is/ought gap is prior to the question about objective goods . The thought is that there would be no way of making sense of ‘objective good’ without appealing in some form to the idea of what an agent should or ought to pursue. No doubt some would-be defenders of objective goods do think that way, but one need not (and Aristotelians tend not to, it is worth mentioning). It is, rather, possible to give an account of what it is for something to be a basic objective good in terms of the basic teleological capacities that characterize any kind of being, and to maintain that any reasons for action that such a being could have are grounded in facts about the relationship between those kinds of action and the promotion, respect, and defense of those basic goods. Since reasons for action are, on this account, what make ’should’ or ‘ought’ claims true, there can be objective goods whose objectivity is not a function of what any agent should or ought to do, but which instead provide the basis for what any agent should or ought to do.
Of course, all I’ve done here is to outline the conceptual structure of such a theory; I haven’t done anything to argue that there is a defensible view with that structure. I obviously think that there is (in fact I think there are several incompatible views with that basic structure, each of which is defensible in the minimal sense that intelligent, informed people of good will can give strong reasons in favor of them). My point here, though, is simply to try to clarify what the conceptual possibilities are, so that those who find the is/ought gap impossible to bridge might see that there are more alternative positions than they believe. It’s abundantly clear, for instance, that Xenu’s difficulties with ‘objective morality’ stem in large part from assumptions about what that would have to involve — namely, constraints on the action of all human beings, constraints which have their force regardless of what ends or goals any human being pursues. It’s pretty plain that the real dispute here is about objective goods and about the relationship between goods, reasons, and ‘ought’ claims.
Perhaps this helps?