During December 27-30, 2007 I attended the annual eastern division meeting of the American Philosophical Society. There I offered comments on Roderick’s paper, “Inside and Outside Spooner’s Natural Law Jurisprudence,” presented as part of the Molinari Society Symposium. I have been remiss in procrastinating on typing up and posting my comments. So now, fully a month later, here they are.

I understand the purpose of Roderick’s paper to be to reconcile two seemingly contradictory positions or theories on the relation between liberal legal norms and positive/customary law apparently held by Lysander Spooner before and after the Civil War, respectively.

For those who have themselves been remiss in reading Spooner – shame on you! ;o) – Spooner’s arguments against slavery, militarism, gender inequality, plutocratic privilege and the monopoly state, and his defense of free markets as against the corporate-capitalist wage system, are primarily based on legal reasoning.

Roderick points out that in Spooner’s prewar writings he appears to critique and interpret positive laws from norms arising within it. In contrast, in his postwar writings, he seems to reject positive law entirely from an external critique grounded in natural law. Roderick points out that both positions considered separately, and on their face, might seem absurd. Roderick argues persuasively instead that both approaches are actually manifestations of a single and attractive natural law theory. The differences between them arise merely from a shift in emphasis.

The cause of the shift is unknown, and there may be more than one, but one can speculate that disgust with both sides over the war was a major contributing factor. Positive law, as embodied by the Constitution, had either failed to prevent the grave abuses of the past seventy years, including the war, or it had in fact authorized them. Either way, these facts were a clear indictment.

Roderick further points out that even in his prewar writings Spooner held natural law to be an external constraint on positive law, but he often preferred to interpret positive law documents on their own merits. Moreover, Spooner could invoke natural law on positive law grounds in the form of libertarian legal norms applied more consistently than is usually the case.

Roderick argues intriguingly that the foundation of Spooner’s natural law theory seems to be that some degree of reliance on libertarian principles is necessary in order to have a workable social order. So the greater the reliance the better the social order functions, and the less the worse. The distinction between Spooner’s “immanent” and “external” approach blurs with the understanding that the nature and content of natural law emerges from the requirements of law as such. In other words, as Roderick formulates the argument: “legal institutions cannot function without these natural law principles, so these natural law principles are to be regarded as part of law as such” (p. 31).

There is an issue on which I do not think Roderick is entirely successful, however, and that is in reconciling Spooner’s pre- and post-war positions on the status of positive law. Roderick says that the difference is not so great as it might appear; however, the difference being not so great does not eliminate the difference entirely. Prewar Spooner accepted some role for adding specificity to natural law and thereby creating additional obligations. Postwar Spooner held that positive law adds nothing to natural law. Long explains that the new positive law obligations can just be seen as applications of prior natural law obligations, and this is true as a matter of reducibility to the ultimate source of obligation. However, this is no justification for doing away with positive law entirely. Positive law does add specificity to, and other obligations not present in, natural law alone, even though we are only obligated to obey the positive law because of a more fundamental natural law obligation.

A case in point being our customary moral and legal obligation in America to drive on the right side of the road. Natural law does not specify which side of the road we ought to drive on. It does specify that we ought not to recklessly endanger the lives of others. Given that driving on just any part of a road we like will endanger our own lives and the lives of others, it makes sense that sticking to one side or the other will serve to minimize this risk. Which side we drive on is morally arbitrary before it is picked, but once a particular side becomes customary then we have a moral and legal obligation to drive on that side. So we have here two obligations, the one not to recklessly endanger the lives of others and the other to drive on the right side of the road, the one general and the other specific, with the latter being dependent upon the former for its moral and legal force; but the latter was not present in the natural law from the beginning and only arose as a matter of custom to fulfill a particular need. One might further distinguish between these two obligations as the former being a general principle while the latter is a particular or specific rule.

I have a few other minor quibbles with Roderick’s otherwise excellent paper. Regarding the first, a reader not familiar with Spooner may read the first few sections of Roderick’s paper and assume there is something of a controversy over how to interpret Spooner on these two seemingly incompatible approaches. However, Roderick cites no examples of such misinterpretations of Spooner. Then, when such a reader gets farther into the paper he might wonder what all the hubbub from the first few sections was about, i.e., why or even whether there is even any controversy at all, so easily and elegantly does Roderick resolve the apparent quandary. Indeed, the careful reader familiar with a number of Spooner’s major pre- and post-war writings, but not having a comprehensive knowledge of Spooner’s writings and of writings on Spooner, might well wonder the same thing. I myself am one of these carefully reading Spooner-philes not familiar with all of Spooner’s writings or all writings on Spooner. I wonder if there are any published examples of misinterpretations of Spooner related to the subject of this paper. If there are, I think some of them should be mentioned. If there are not, well, the paper still performs a valuable service in clearly, concisely and elegantly explicating the theory of natural law underlying Spooner’s two approaches. I have no disagreements with Roderick’s presentation and interpretation of Spooner, the sole exception being that which I discussed in the two previous paragraphs.

The second minor quibble pertains to something I would have liked to see in the paper, and that is perhaps a brief sketch of how Spooner’s theory of natural law could be grounded in a eudaimonist virtue ethics, in human nature. This would be useful, in particular, for those not familiar with how it might be done. I’m not sure if this would make the paper too long, or take it too far afield from its primary purpose, but I offer it as a suggestion nevertheless.

~*~

For a direct link to Roderick’s paper, click here. Charles Johnson’s paper “A Place for Positive Law: A Contribution to Anarchist Legal Theory,” presented on the same panel, is also a recommended read and a nice complement to Roderick’s paper.

Well, I’ve finally completed the first draft of my first dissertation chapter, chapter two (chapter one being the introduction which I will write later). This is the central chapter of the dissertation. I’m hoping to get it published as a separate journal article as well. The working title is “Eudaimonia, Virtue, and the Right to Liberty.” Comments welcome. For more information about my dissertation, see this post.

Abstract
The paper is a dissertation chapter. It seeks to build on the work of Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl in developing an Aristotelian liberalism, which holds that the right to liberty is a metanormative principle necessary for protecting the possibility of self-direction, a necessary condition for all forms of eudaimonia (human well-being, flourishing, happiness). Contra Rasmussen and Den Uyl, however, it will be argued that rights are first and foremost a set of interpersonal moral principles the respecting of which is a necessary and constitutive part of human flourishing. The natural right to liberty is a normative safeguard for that feature common to all forms of human flourishing and necessary for moral agency as such: self-direction. For an action to count as virtuous, and therefore constitutive of a life of well-being, it needs be chosen not only because it is right and good but chosen freely and because we desire it. As rational, political, and social animals we ought to conduct our common affairs through public discourse, rational persuasion, and voluntary cooperation rather than through violence or the threat thereof. Liberty and respecting the equal liberty of others are thus essential and constitutive parts of one’s own eudaimonia. Rights-violating behavior not only infringes on or destroys the moral agency of the patient but also harms the well-being of the agent.

In response to Al Gore’s attempt to enlist his help in discrediting skeptics of global warming alarmism by making a big deal of alleged or actual funding they had received from corporations, Ted Koppel responded: “Is this a case of industry supporting scientists who happen to hold sympathetic views, or scientists adapting their views to accommodate industry?” Koppel continued chastisingly:

There is some irony in the fact that Vice President Gore – one of the most scientifically literate men to sit in the White House in this century – [is] resorting to political means to achieve what should ultimately be resolved on a purely scientific basis. The measure of good science is neither the politics of the scientist nor the people with whom the scientist associates. It is the immersion of hypotheses into the acid of truth. That’s the hard way to do it, but it’s the only way that works. (Nightline, “Is Environmental Science for Sale?” February 24, 1994)

Global warming alarmists often try to discredit skeptics by alluding to their alleged or actual source of funding (however large or small, it doesn’t matter to the alarmists) as if this invalidates their claims. This underhanded tactic is a perfect example of the logical fallacy ad hominem and amounts to a personal attack on the victim’s integrity. One could just as easily, if not more so, make the same accusation against government funded scientists but this would be just as unsatisfactory an argument against the substance of their claims. For more on conduct unbecoming of a scientist, see my blogpost on scientific skepticism.

A few personal notes on this issue: The quickest way to get me to dismiss you as an ideologue and alarmist is to raise the issue of funding in an effort to discredit the substantive claims of a particular scientist or group of scientists. This is not a valid argument and serves only to reveal your biases. I find it especially disturbing when self-described libertarians do this. Any good libertarian ought to be critical of corporate “capitalism” but it shows a remarkable lack of understanding (especially for a libertarian) to be critical of corporate funding while being blasé about government and other special interest funding.

Update (3pm): It is ironic that some alarmists can recognize ad hominem arguments when made against their own but not when they make them against skeptics.

A couple of weeks ago I successfully defended my dissertation research proposal. The dissertation’s working title is “Aristotelian Liberalism: An Inquiry into the Foundations of a Free and Flourishing Society.” If you’re interested, you can read the proposal here (pdf).

The Epigraphs
Freedom is, in truth, a sacred thing. There is only one thing else that better serves the name: that is virtue. But then what is virtue if not the free choice of what is good?
− Alexis de Tocqueville

The practical reason for freedom, then, is that freedom seems to be the only condition under which any kind of substantial moral fibre can be developed.
− Albert Jay Nock

The Abstract
My dissertation seeks to build on the recent work of Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl in developing an Aristotelian liberalism. They argue that the right to liberty is a metanormative ethical principle necessary for protecting the possibility of self-direction, which is central to and necessary for all forms of eudaimonia (human flourishing, well-being, happiness). Contra Rasmussen and Den Uyl, however, it will be argued that rights are also, and more fundamentally, a set of interpersonal ethical principles the respecting of which is a necessary and constitutive part of eudaimonia. The dissertation will attempt to show that not only does a neo-Aristotelian philosophy provide (classical) liberalism with a sounder foundation, it also provides liberalism with the resources to answer traditional left-liberal, postmodern, communitarian and conservative challenges by avoiding some Enlightenment pitfalls that have plagued it since its inception: atomism, an a-historical and a-contextual view of human nature, license, excessive normative neutrality, the impoverishment of ethics and the trivialization of rights. It will be further argued, however, that there is still an excessive focus on the State and what it can and should do for us; and that the focus needs to return to the notion of politics as discourse and deliberation between equals in joint pursuit of eudaimonia and to what we as members of society can and should do for ourselves and each other. In order to fully answer left-liberal, postmodern, communitarian and conservative challenges it will be necessary to elucidate the ethical and cultural principles and institutions that are necessary for bringing about and maintaining a free society that promotes human flourishing, and this can be done without endangering liberalism’s commitment to liberty and pluralism.

Those who are interested can check out the rough drafts of my seminar papers of last semester. One is a critique of Roman virtue and liberty and how these are at the root of Rome’s rise and fall. The other is on praxeology and the question of Aristotelian apriorism. For the latter, I still have to work in how praxeology is compatible with Objectivism, however.

Here’s the last of my reaction papers on Roman political philosophy: De Libertate Romanorum. Links to the other three can be found here. My full-length analysis will be posted in a couple of weeks.

I recently submitted abstracts for two papers to the APSA for their August 2006 annual conference. I’ll know in a few months whether either of them has been accepted. The abstracts are reproduced below. One of the papers is a work in progress, the other is one that I plan to right before the conference.

Also, my department’s GSA (Graduate Student Association) started publishing a one page newsletter for the graduate students of my department not too long ago, so I submitted these abstracts as well as a short blurb on my research interests for it. They’ll probably be appearing within the next month or two, although The POLIgraph is hardly a publication of note.

POLIgraph blurb on my research interests:

Geoffrey Plauché, 4th Year Ph.D. Student, Political Theory

My interests are fairly broad and varied, but my current research is primarily in the areas of philosophy of science, Aristotelian ethical and political thought, and liberalism (in the classical/libertarian sense of the word).

In philosophy of science, I am particularly exploring dialectics as a methodological “orientation toward contextual analysis of the systemic and dynamic relations of components within a totality” (Chris Matthew Sciabarra, Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism, Penn. State U. Press, 2000; p. 173). In short, it is the art of context-keeping. A dialectical analysis of social phenomena involves three conceptually distinct but interrelated levels of generality: 1) the personal (psycho-epistemological, ethical), 2) the cultural (linguistic, ideological), and 3) the structural (economic, political). I am also exploring praxeology, the exact and a priori general science of human action; it is the distinctive method of the Austrian School of economics and is, I think, the proper foundation for economics (its most developed branch) as well as ethics (see http://praxeology.net/praxeo.htm).

Although not set in stone yet, as I will be taking my comprehensive exams in April 2006, my dissertation will likely be on the subject of Aristotelian liberalism. It will contribute to the relatively new but growing body of work attempting to synthesize the best features of Aristotelian ethical and political thought and liberal political and economic thought. Perhaps the most prominent thinkers in this field are Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl. Aristotelian liberalism attempts to transcend the liberal/communitarian debate by embracing liberalism’s commitment to pluralism, diversity, and the free market while grounding politics in a eudaimonistic theory of virtue ethics and natural rights. Aristotelian liberalism, I believe, avoids the specters that continue to plague communitarianism – paternalism and totalitarianism – and the traditional communitarian and conservative criticisms of liberalism – atomism and license – while promoting freedom in community and human flourishing.

Abstract for “On the Social Contract Theory and the Persistence of Anarchy”
By Geoffrey Plauché

Traditional social contract theory holds that the origin and purpose of government is to escape the state of nature and its perceived deficiencies. The state of nature is conceived of as being anarchic, meaning that there is no monopolistic common authority to provide security, determine the law, and adjudicate conflicting claims and secure compliance. It will be the argument of this paper that this attempt at justifying the State with social contract theory ultimately fails. We can never really get out of anarchy. The formation of states does not eliminate anarchy but rather transforms natural anarchy into other types, the most well-known and widely recognized of which is international anarchy (i.e., the anarchic relationship that exists between states in the international system). Even the formation of a World-State will not eliminate anarchy. It will be argued that there are at least four major types of anarchy, determined in large part by the structure of the power relationships within them. In light of this, the fundamental issue ceases to be whether the State or anarchy is to be preferred, but rather becomes which type of anarchy is to be preferred.

Abstract for “Moral Legislation and Democracy: The Devlin-Dworkin-Hart Debate Revisited”
By Geoffrey Plauché

In the latter half of the last century, the prominent legal theorists Lord Patrick Devlin, Ronald Dworkin, and H.L.A. Hart engaged in a debate over the issue of moral legislation and democracy. Lord Devlin argued for the right of society, through democratic institutions, to protect and preserve its moral traditions. Dworkin and Hart each effectively criticized Devlin’s arguments in their own way, but it will be argued that even Dworkin and Hart do not completely close the door to moral legislation. More importantly, it will be argued that Devlin’s argument for the right of society to enact moral legislation fails on its own grounds. Political and economic theory and history inform us that granting the power of moral legislation to the State, even a democratic one, actually has the opposite effect Devlin expects. Rather than preserve existing moral institutions, the power of the State tends inevitably to be commandeered by (coalitions of) vocal minorities who favor alternative institutions, giving them a disproportionate influence over legislation and the vast coercive power of the State compared to that of the silent majority. This leads to significantly faster change in traditional institutions than would result from moral suasion and laissez-faire social evolution. It will also be argued that Devlin’s rights-based argument suffers from two logical fallacies: composition and misplaced concreteness. Finally, a distinction will be made between vices and crimes, and it will be argued that only the latter should legally justify the use of force.

Below are links to three short reaction paper-type essays that I have written so far this semester for a seminar I am taking on Roman political philosophy. They are only my preliminary thoughts on the underlying causes of Rome’s rise and fall. A fourth short paper will follow in about a week and a half, and in a month or so I will revise and consolidate my thoughts in a 20-25 page final paper. The usual caveats for my reaction papers applies; there may be errors or gaps in the argument that will be fixed or filled in at a later date. These short 5-7 page double spaced papers don’t really provide enough space to make the arguments I want to make, but I try to do what I can and provide a small slice of the fuller argument I intend to make in my final paper.

Roman Imperialism and the Murder-Suicide of Classical Civilization

On Roman Liberty, Virtue, and Eudaimonia

On Tyranny, Virtue, and Habituation to Subjection

Kevin Carson has noticed our debate and gives a brief but useful summary of it. The debate about anarchism, particularly on market and non-market institutions within society, continues in the wake of his post as well as a deep discussion about time. Check it out.

Addendum (10:47 pm): Speaking of anarchy, check out this discussion on anarchy, minarchy, and (an/the?) Anarchism Anti-Defamation League at L&P sparked by Sheldon Richman. I just left a comment defending anarchy and anarchists from a rhetorical (one might say sophistical) trick by Irfan Khawaja. You’ll see what I mean when you read the discussion, but I say rhetorical or sophistical because like most minarchists Irfan seems to be readily dismissive of anarchy, makes unsupported assertions in favor of minarchy, and attempts to undermine anarchism by claiming there is a one-sided relationship regarding anarchists defaming the minarchist state using examples of failures by states minarhists wouldn’t support and statists defaming anarchy using examples of chaos to which anarchists deny the label anarchism. The anarchists, he claims, want to have their cake and eat it too; they simply like to defame the state but don’t like it when minarchists and other statists defame anarchy. The difference lies, I think, in the tendency among anarchists to appreciate and understand the moral and economic deficiencies of the state, but the veritable dearth of minarchists who take anarchism even half seriously. The relationship is actually the opposite of what he claims. The day I see minarchists making an effort to appreciate, understand, and deal with the moral and practical arguments in favor of anarchism is the day that the relationship will not be altogether one-sided.

Now that my power has been restored I can get back to full-fledged blogging and respond to John Kennedy’s response to my recent post on libertarian strategies. That could be delayed a bit due to the out of town wedding I am attending soon. Until then, Micha Ghertner of Catallarchy posted a quote from John’s earlier post, prompting a debate. I tend to agree with Micha’s comment here. I also agree with Chris Sciabarra’s August 28th, 8:30 PM comment here.

The debate on anarchism and dualism (see here for all the relevant links) has shifted to a debate about strategies for bringing about (and maintaining) a libertarian-anarchic society. So far the discussion is largely being conducted on Chris’s blog here and John Kennedy’s No Treason (see the comments in Chris’s blog post for the particular link).

I agree with Chris that there are multiple strategies for bringing about such a society. Indeed, multiple strategies will be necessary. No single strategy will work by itself. I also agree with Chris that politics is one of them, albeit a limited one (particularly in today’s corrupt environment). Generally, to succeed in politics one must not only compromise one’s principles but become very good at it. The more statist the society, the more this is true. And even if you can get elected without compromising your principles, it is difficult if not impossible to get anything done (at least at the national level) that is moral and just. Texas Representative Ron Paul is arguably the only virtuous national politician, but even his vote is only 1 in 435. I’m sure he does some good, especially as part of the committee that oversees the Fed, but his influence and power are limited. Moreover, one must not overlook the danger of being co-opted as one begins to see success in politics.

Again, I agree with Chris that the battle is primarily a cultural one on the level of personal and socio-cultural (including business firms) principles and institutions. There are multiple avenues by which to approach this culture war. In academia, libertarians can continue to plug away with libertarian-themed journal articles and books as well as, and perhaps more importantly, providing an increasing number of students with an antidote to woefully inadequate and mistaken statist education (both in public and private schools). Outside of academia one can promote libertarian ideas in the media (op-eds, letters to the editor, tv news commentaries, documentaries, blogs and websites, etc.), in the arts and entertainment (fiction writing (from short stories to novels), comic books, cartoons, music, plays, tv shows, movies, etc.), having children and teaching them libertarian ideas, by ignoring the State as much as possible and creating and encouraging the growth of alternative societal institutions (such as homeschooling, fraternal societies, clubs, neighborhood committees, church-related organizations, charities, and new businesses). This is partly the rational evangelism that John disparages, but not entirely. Rational argumentation often has little effect by itself on those who are old and set in their ways, but the young are more open to new, radical, and true ideas. Moreover, what Chris and I advocate is not rational argumentation merely, but rational action. Different people have different talents and resources to bring to bear on this culture war and so will be better at different avenues of attack. You should do what you can. Rational argumentation will often play a role but it must be supplemented by, or rather supplement, a bevy of other strategies many of which I have already mentioned.

One important avenue that I have mentioned, and John emphasizes as well, is libertarian-run businesses. Yet business, while important, is only one institution of collective action that libertarians can use to ignore, avoid, and undermine the State. John also includes a related issue: invention. I certainly agree that certain new technologies can and will be used to help to create a libertarian-anarchic society. However, John’s argument that so-called “rational evangelism” won’t work and that “the state will have it’s [sic] way as long as enough people approve of it…is simply not the case” is wrong, and his focus on the role of technology borders on determinism. Are certain advanced technologies necessary in order to bring about and maintain a libertarian-anarchic society? John has not explicitly told us if this is the case, and if so, why; but his argument seems to imply that it is. Moreover, if certain technologies are necessary for liberty, then it appears that in a society without said technologies there is an inescapable gulf between the moral and the practical. Ultimately, what technologies are invented and how they will be used is determined by ideas. Email encryption won’t do people much good if people think that they are obligated to let the government through it, or if a majority of the people think the State has the right to punish those who don’t. It is the ideas that people hold that we need to change. Technology can be a useful tool, both for bringing about such change and for keeping out and ignoring the State. Libertarians with the expertise could work on inventing, promoting, selling, and defending new technologies that can serve the libertarian cause.

I think John and I are in agreement about the limited usefulness of collective political movements like the Libertarian Party, however, although I’m not sure he would agree with me that they are not entirely useless or counterproductive.

Update (8/27): Chris’s blog post, “The Rose Petal Assumption,” is also an important read on this subject.

Update (8/28): Walter Block’s recent essay “Austrians in Academia: A Battle Plan” is also useful reading, although it is primarily geared toward economics graduate students and professors. Also, some of the advice for graduate students depends on the character and temperament of their committee members. Luckily, mine, at least so far, have not held my radical libertarianism against me when it comes to grading papers and exams and evaluating my M.A. thesis.

I don’t know if the person whose post prompted this one will read it, but here goes. I feel the need to clarify my position anyway.

William J. Beck III over at www.two-four.net happened to read some of my exchange with Chris Sciabarra on anarchy and dualism. (See my posts here, here, and here.) For the most part I agree with what he wrote in his post (here), but there are two things about his post to which I wish to respond. First, is his assumption that in a libertarian-anarchist society all previously “governmental” functions would be run like businesses. Second, is his understandable confusion about what Chris and I mean by dualism and why it is dangerous.

1) I think the assumption that in a libertarian-anarchist society all previously “governmental” functions would be run like businesses is too hasty and most probably mistaken. It is conceivable that there might be many services that might be better provided or only provided by non-business institutions, perhaps in some cases instead of but also quite possibly alongside businesses. Take, for instance, unemployment “insurance.” Now, strictly speaking unemployment is not insurable. (See here (mp3 audio file) for why.) However, institutions like the family, the extended family, fraternal societies (like America had in the 19th century; see here), clubs, churches, neighborhood communities, and so forth, could provide support for the temporarily and unexpectedly unemployed while having the close proximity and knowledge of time and place necessary to prevent or minimize abuse of the service. Similarly for other services. Even security production need not be exclusively provided by businesses. In no way, however, do we need the State to provide all of these services and, indeed, it invariably does a poor job of providing them (not to speak of the other accompanying negatives).

2) I don’t have the time to provide a full explanation of what Chris and I mean by dualism and why we think it is problematic. A brief quote from Chris’s book Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism will perhaps suffice: “Emerging out of the strict-atomist emphasis on analytical isolation, dualism is an orientation toward analysis by separation of a system’s components into two spheres. The dualist identifies two mutually exclusive, externally related spheres. These spheres are expressions of two distinct principles, which the dualist often sees as irreducible and in logical opposition to one another. However, while dualists share with atomists a commitment to external relations, they share with organicists a tendency toward systematization, albeit one that depends entirely upon the classification of all factors along two fundamental axes of inquiry.” (166-167; emphasis in original) We’re primarily concerned with methodology and the errors to which a flawed methodology can lead. The most pervasive dualist metaphysic is the notorious mind-body dichotomy, but dualism has resulted in a vast number of other false dichotomies: fact-value, analytic-synthetic, impositionist-reflectionist, altruist-egoist, anarchist-statist, State vs. Market. Often dualists hold one sphere to be superior to the other and project an eventual and necessary monist resolution as, for instance, the Market absorbs all of the functions of the parasitical State in an anarcho-capitalist society. Often both sides of these dichotomies contain some kernel of truth. One of the most noteworthy aspects of Rand’s philosophy is her largely successful attempt at transcending many of these false dichotomies.

Addendum: Chris has chimed in with a post of his own in response to mine. In it he expands somewhat on what I have said here. The only thing I would disagree with him on is his belief that “the anarchist resolution is not dialectical.” I say it depends on what kind of anarchist you are whether one’s “anarchist resolution” is dialectical or dualist. A Rothbardian anarcho-capitalist may indeed be a dualist, but libertarian anarchism as I have described it does not seem to be dualistic; indeed, it seems positively dialectical!

Update (08/21): Billy Beck responds to our posts, clarifying his position as well and taking me to task on my attempt to salvage the word ‘government’ from ordinary and corrupted usage. It seems he was using business terminology for market and non-market exchanges, transactions, and cooperation, much like Rand’s Trader Principle and her general talk of exchanging values. Okay, it seems we have no disagreement there. To head off any misunderstandings, I am a capitalist in the Randian, Misesian, and Rothbardian sense of that word. I’m also very much an Aristotelian/Randian natural rights theorist, and not a utilitarian. The crux of the issue seems to come down to my attempt to salvage the word ‘government’ from traditional identification with State politics. In short, the issue is primarily terminological and definitional. That’s fine. I don’t need to use the word ‘government’ and I may eventually decide that it isn’t worth salvaging. However, I can’t help but wonder why the terms ‘government’ and ‘governmental’ can’t be used to refer to a vast interconnected, overlapping web of polycentric legal, security, insurance, surety, assurance, and other institutions. Did not Thomas Jefferson talk about the “blessings of self-government“?

To supplement my previous posts (1 and 2) on the subject of anarchy, it occurred to me that Constitutional Anarchy is probably a better term for what I have thus far called Republican Anarchy. It is not classical republicanism but constitutionalism under which the principle of the separation of powers properly falls. The term Constitutional Anarchy also ties in better with Long’s arguments (cited in my first post) that libertarian anarchy is a constitutional order in which the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances have been radically decentralized and carried to their logical and most efficacious conclusion. In this light, one can see Constitutional Anarchy as being possible within the three other categories of anarchy I have termed Natural Anarchy, Hobbesian State Anarchy, and World-State (or Universal-State) Anarchy. In the first, it could manifest as stateless (but not necessarily governmentless) libertarian anarchy. But in the latter two, in which the State achieves an increasing degree of monopolization, constitutional anarchy can manifest within certain states founded upon constitutionalism and the separation of powers and checks and balances become increasingly inefficacious due to the necessarily doomed attempt at artificially creating a merely superficial imitation of market competition and social power (as opposed to State power).

My original post was brief and hasty (a bad habit of mine I’m trying to break, and it obviously failed to convince the sympathetic but skeptical Chris. Although I cannot, at this point in time, write a full length article or book on the subject, I think it would be worthwhile to elaborate on my argument.

The key to elaborating a nondualist view of libertarian anarchy is not, I think, the melding of key Hayekian and Nockian insights regarding society, government, and the State. Although this point is important, the key lies in the recognition that there are different kinds of anarchy and that we can never really get out of anarchy.

The formation of an international system of states quite obviously does not get us out of anarchy. This point is widely accepted even by the positivist-empiricist community of international relations scholars. The international system of states is characterized as anarchic, because there is no overarching monopolistic authority to promulgate law, provide security, or resolve disputes. I have termed this category of anarchy Hobbesian State Anarchy. It’s most obvious anarchic relationship is that between states, but there are other anarchic relationships included in this category as well. The State and its citizens are in an anarchic relationship, for there is no overarching authority governing this relationship. In any dispute between citizen and State, the citizen must turn to the State (or some branch thereof) for the ultimate decision. Ironically, although one of the defects that Locke saw in his fictitious state of nature was that there would be no third party to resolve disputes (a defect because of the widely held belief that men should not judge their own case due to an unavoidable bias in their own favor), the monopolistic State always ends up judging its own cases! Moreover, the relationship between citizens of different states and between states and the citizens of other states is also anarchic for, I think, obvious reasons. Only if one accepts some sort of strained social contract theory a la Hobbes or Locke would have reason to deny these additional anarchic relationships. Hobbes and Locke see the State or Commonwealth as being one corporate body, thus eliminating the possibility of anarchic relationships within that body (even when foreigners are involved). Locke, however, did argue that if the sovereign violated the rights of citizens the Commonwealth is essentially sundered and plunged into a state of war. I do not think that the mystical union of the corporate body that is the Hobbesian or Lockean Commonwealth is true to the facts of reality, however.

The formation of a World-State, or a Solar System State, or a Galactic State, or even a Universal State (in the physical sense of the world) cannot get us out of anarchy. International anarchy (that between states) is eliminated, as are the anarchic relationships between citizens of different states and between states and citizens of other states. However, if it is a unitary government (only one level of goverment) then the citizens are still in an anarchic relationship with the State. If it is a federal system, the states and their citizens are still in an anarchic relationship with the Super State. The attempt to find an overarching authority for all socio-political relationships is impossible, for even the most universal State imaginable would lack an overarching authority for its relationship with its citizens. In my previous post I mentioned Republican Anarchy as well, but I need not elaborate on it here.

Thus, we can never really get out of anarchy. The formation of different kinds of states merely alters the kind of anarchy within which we live. The question then is not Statism or Anarchism, state or anarchy. It is actually Statism and the State that introduce the dualistic false dichotomoy between living under law and order with the State or in chaos and disorder with anarchy. Statism introduces and/or perpetuates such dualisms as producers and pseudo-producers, wealth-makers and wealth-appropriators, masters and slaves, self-sacrifice vs. other-sacrifice, and many more. Insofar as anarchists have made their arguments along similar lines, using this false dichotomy (albeit while reversing the concommitants of law/order/prosperity and chaos/disorder/misery), they are mistakenly adopting the very dualistic premise of Statism.

We are always in some sort of anarchy. If there is a dualism inherent in libertarian anarchism, it is between society and the State or a free society and the State, and not between Market and State or Anarchy and State. But there are three major reasons why I do not believe there is a dualism here.

1) The primary political choice in this context is between which kind of anarchy is preferrable – Natural Anarchy, Hobbesian State Anarchy, or World-State Anarchy – not which kind of State is preferrable, or whether State or Anarchy is preferrable. The category of Natural Anarchy is not necessarily a libertarian anarchy; that would depend upon the kinds of institutions prevailent in a naturally anarchic society. There could be liberty, law, order, and flourishing, or there could be chaos, disorder, frequent initiation of force, and before long the rise of states and the shift to a different kind of anarchy.

2) Yes, there is a necessary mutual opposition between State and society, but the State is merely one organization/institution within society. It is not the only group of individuals/organizations/institutions (or even single individuals) that operates by the initiation of force and, thus, the violation of rights. And there are different kinds of states. There are also countless organizations and institutions within society that do not operate by the initiation for force. Ultimately, however, society is just a large number of individuals existing within certain social and structural relationships. The apparent opposition between State and society, and between other coercive organizations and society, boils down to an opposition between individuals who choose to live by the initiation of force and individuals who choose to live by voluntary exchange (even here we must recognize that many individuals operate by both methods). A free society along the lines of libertarian anarchism is one that exists in Natural Anarchy and in which a majority of the people relate with each other through voluntary means most of the time. What form government might take in such a society I will not speculate on here, except to say that law, security, and justice need not be provided only by market institutions but market institutions may make up a large part of such voluntary government.

3) The initiation of force is primarily a political (or structural level) concern. A fully nondualistic view of libertarian anarchy must take into account the socio-cultural and personal levels of analysis as well. Here we can recognize subtler forms of coercion, such as what might be called soft authoritarian institutions (paternalism, parentalism, tribalism, racism, nationalism, altruism, etc.), as well as psycho-epistemological, epistemological, ethical, aesthetic errors (and the socio-cultural institutions that encourage them) that hinder liberty and flourishing and promote statism. A truly ideal, free society will be one in which the majority of citizens possess and/or are encouraged by their social and structural institutions to be autonomous in the political and personal and social dimensions of their lives. I believe that an ideal libertarian-anarchic society will not be achieved, much less maintained, if we only attend to political and economic institutions. All three levels – the personal, the socio-cultural, and the structural (political and economic) will have to converge in order to bring about and maintain a free society. We will not get free political and economic institutions until we get liberty-promoting socio-cultural institutions and autonomous persons, and vice versa. Snapping a finger and eliminating the State overnight will not a free society make. A revolution on multiple levels will be required and it will take time. Is this utopian? Not in the sense of being impossible (as prosperous socialism is impossible). But it is idealistic (and I don’t mean this in a pejorative sense).

Ultimately, I think that political theories that assume straight out that we need some sort of State, including that of Rasmussen and Den Uyl, move too fast. Politics is not primarily about the State, but about (and here I show my Aristotelian colors) human flourishing and, consequently, about justice and rights. Whether and what kind of government is justified or needed are secondary questions. I do not believe the State is compatible with justice, rights, and human flourishing.

In his books, Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical and Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism, and elsewhere, Chris Sciabarra relates Ayn Rand’s criticism (as well as his own) of the apparently dualistic nature of anarchism (especially Rothbard’s version). Sciabarra is far more sympathetic to anarchism than Rand ever was. In this post I will, for the sake of argument, accept that dualism is problematic. (Though I tend to agree that it is, I do not wish to debate this point here. Critics of this assumption are directed to Sciabarra’s work.) My argument is that anarchism is not inherently dualistic.

Note: Full appreciation of this post, since it is brief and sketchy, will require some familiarity with the sources discussed and cited herein.

To begin with, Sciabarra points out in Russian Radical that some have argued that Rand’s defense of individual rights logically commits her to anarchism even though she did not recognize it. Famously, Roy Childs made this argument on Objectivist grounds, though he later (mistakenly I think) recanted. Sciabarra also points out some anarchistic elements in Rand’s own political philosophy. For example, Rand opposed taxation as theft and conscription as slavery (see her essay “Government Financing in a Free Society” in The Virtue of Selfishness). A government that must rely solely on voluntary contributions (via donations, user fees, a lottery, etc.) would be one very unlike anything with which we are familiar. Rand’s definition of government does not necessarily entail a monopolistic institution: “Government is the means of placing the retaliatory use of physical force under objective control – i.e., under objectively defined laws” (“The Nature of Government” in VoS). However, her elaboration of her concept of government does require this. Rand’s contention that government requires a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in a given geographical area and that individuals must delegate their right of self-defense to this institution are the chief contradictions in her political philosophy. Interestingly, Rand apparently did not realize (and Sciabarra does not call her on it) that her definition of capitalism is inherently anarchistic: “Capitalism is a social system based on the recognition of individual rights, including property rights, in which all property is privately owned” (“What is Capitalism?” in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal; emphasis mine). It seems to me that if all property is privately owned, then even Rand’s minimal State could not exist. At least some public property would have to exist and be controlled by government (the State) in order for it to fulfill its monopolistic role as provider of law, security, and justice. This seems to have escaped Sciabarra as well.

Rothbard supposedly sets up a dualism between market and State, a dualism that he apparently would prefer resolving itself into a monism of the market absorbing all of the functions of the State. Perhaps Rothbard was guilty of this to some degree, although I am not certain that this is the extent of Rothbard’s argument for anarcho-capitalism. In any event, I will here attempt to sketch out a nondualistic picture of anarchism.

To begin with, I submit that there are different kinds of anarchism and that Rothbard was aware of this. The following essays elaborate on these different types of anarchism: Alfred Cuzan’s “Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy?” and James Ostrowski’s “The Myth of Democratic Peace.” Rothbard was familiar with Cuzan’s article in JLS. What Cuzan and Ostrowski argue is essentially this: Although the creation of numerous States gets the individual citizens of each out of anarchy with their fellow citizens, anarchy has merely been shifted to the international level between the States themselves. Moreover, anarchy still exists between the State and its subjects (ahem…citizens), between citizens of different States, and between States and the citizens of other States. Cuzan even argues that for States in which the power of government has some degree of separation of powers, the different branches of government are in a state of anarchy with each other because there is no overarching authority. Even the formation of a world government or World-State only eliminates international anarchy, not the other dimensions of anarchy. It is impossible to get completely out of anarchy. So the question then becomes not whether the State or anarchy is to be preferred, but which type of anarchy is to be preferred: Natural Anarchy, Hobbesian State Anarchy with or without Republican Anarchy, or World-State Anarchy with or without Republican Anarchy. (The terms for these categories are my own. See here for a rough illustration.)

To take my nondualistic view of anarchism further, one can combine the insights of F.A. Hayek and Albert J. Nock. For Hayek society is a spontaneous order within which exist numerous organizations (examples of planned order). One can conceive of a global society encompassing all of mankind on earth. Within the global society there are various governmental organizations called States. At this point, I would make Nock’s distinction between government and the State. Government is that institution or set of institutions that produce law, security, and justice without violating the rights of individuals. The State, on the other hand, is a governmental institution (and thus, I think, a perverted species of government), but by its very nature it violates the rights of individuals (citizens and noncitizens alike) and is parasitic upon society. The growth and encroachment of State power necessarily destroys social power (voluntary action, relationships, and exchange). With this distinction I would define the State as Rothbard has, as “that organization which possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost always both) of the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue by physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it acquires a compulsory monopoly of force and of ultimate decision-making power over a given territorial area” (Ethics of Liberty, 172). Government is not monopolistic and need not be tied to a given geographic area; it is fully voluntary. Government, then, is compatible with anarchy (though my definition of government here is even more radical than that of Rand’s, but there always remains the danger that government will transform into a State. Although it is common among anarchists to emphasize that anarchy means ‘no government’ and not ‘no law’, under the view presented here anarchy does not necessarily have to mean ‘no government’ either but rather ‘no State’. Libertarian anarchy, or natural order, would still operate under the rule of law and, as Roderick Long has argued (here and here), radically decentralized constitutional restraints in the form of societal and market separation of powers, checks and balances (including but not limited to market competition).

Moreover, the market is on my view but one aspect of society, so my view is not a dualistic one of market vs. State, but rather one in which government and society are compatible within one of several different kinds of anarchy. While the State and society are still mutually opposed to one another, the State is a perversion of government. To co-opt a line from Russian Radical, describing Rand’s view, for my own purposes: “the initiation of force is a crucial component in the genesis of social dualism” (298). It is, rather, the State and statism that introduce dualism into society and not anarchism. The State, especially the modern State, is a historical phenomenon that needs to be overcome, although this overcoming is not guaranteed and will entail a veritable revolution on multiple levels: psycho-epistemological, epistemological, ethical, socio-cultural, economical, political, legal, aesthetic. I wholeheartedly agree with Sciabarra and Rand that simply changing or attempting to change our political and/or economic institutions without changing the rest will be disastrous or impossible. We cannot ignore the necessary foundations and concommitants of a viable free society.

I have obviously only provided the barest of sketches, but I think this suffices to point the way to a nondualistic view of libertarian anarchism.

Addendum (07/13): I should add that the State is not the only organization, institution, individual or set of individuals in society that operates via the initiation of physical force. Achieving libertarian anarchy is no guarantee not only that our society will remain free but also that all forms of force initiation have been eliminated. Examples could be: sporadic or organized crime, abusive family relationships, private slavery, and so forth. I merely see the State as being the chief enemy of liberty; it is the most visible, the best organized, the most powerful, and has the advantage of economies of scale in terms of the ability to violate rights on a massive scale. It is the greatest threat to individual liberty, but not the only threat. Moreover, there are more subtle forms of coercion than physical coercion (or the initiation of physical force). We need to be concerned not only with political autonomy but also with social autonomy (or independence from blind obedience to authority and the social structures that promote such) and personal autonomy (or being a harmonious, rational, integrated being; not being alienated from our subconscious, our emotions, and our body; not being ruled by our passions, fears, drugs, etc.). I’ll blog more on these three dimensions of autonomy at a later date. Discussions of anarchism and statism deal primarily with the structural level of analysis, but we must also bear in mind the personal and socio-cultural levels. Check out Sciabarra’s response post for his take on anarchism and dualism. My brief comments don’t do justice to his position on anarchism, minarchism, and Rothbard’s political thought.

As I mentioned in my previous post, I’ve been reading Sciabarra’s Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical. While I agree with him much of the time and I’ve found his speculations about Nietzsche’s influence on Rand to be interesting and informative, I cannot (at least at the moment) completely agree with his interpretation of Nietzsche as championing Master morality over Slave morality, Dionysus over Apollo, and subjectivist egoism over intrinsicist altruism. It has been a long while since I have read Nietzsche so I don’t have citations readily at hand to back up my suggestions, but my recollected interpretation of Nietzsche is that he tried to transcend these dichotomies with his doctrine of the Overman. Although Nietzsche appears to champion Dionysus in his later work it was my impression that he continued to use the term Dionysus as a synthesis of his early conceptions of Dionysus and Apollo. Similarly, he did not argue that the Master morality should be adopted instead of the Slave morality, but rather (like Marx’s critique of capitalism) recognized the good and the bad in it. He remarks in his Genealogy of Morals that Slave morality is a disease in the sense that pregnancy is a disease. He credited Slave morality with the creation of the soul. He recognized the good aspects of Apollo. I realize my own thoughts are rather tentative and suggestive on this, so just take it as food for thought. One of these days I’ll have to go back and reread Nietzsche in order to confirm or deny this interpretation and maybe write up a scholarly essay on it. It may well be that in the final analysis Nietzsche remained a subjectivist egoist, but if I am right his thought is more subtle and dialectical than even Doctor Diabolical Dialectical himself realizes.

I comment over at the Mises Econ Blog in response to commentary on today’s daily article, Rothbard’s “The Case for Radical Idealism.”

While I agree with Rothbard’s general argument for radical idealism as opposed to gradualist opportunism and utopian sectarianism, there is an element of his argument in this essay with which I am not convinced. In short, Rothbard seems to greatly underappreciate the structural, cultural, and ethical foundations (particularly the latter two) that are necessary for the functioning of an anarcho-libertarian society, not to speak of being necessary for bringing it about in the first place. How is the state to be abolished, especially in such a way as to not pave the way for a new state to arise from its ashes, without a corresponding sea change in the institutions and values of the people? It seems to me that the state will not be abolished (for the most part) until there has been a significant cultural shift toward libertarianism. Likewise, it seems to me that if the state is abolished in a cultural climate alien to libertarianism, then the result will be first anarchism in the popular (not philosophical) sense of that word followed by the revival of the state by some new warlord. Thus, Rothbard teeters on the precipice of utopianism, though anarcho-libertarianism need not be utopian.